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Abstract
Background: System analyses of incidents that occur in the process of health care delivery are
rare. A case study of a series of incidents that one of the authors experienced after routine urologic
surgery is presented. We interpret the sequence of events as a case of cascading incidents that
resulted in outcomes that were suboptimal, although fortunately not fatal.
Methods:  A system dynamics approach was employed to develop illustrative models (flow
diagrams) of the dynamics of the patient's interaction with surgery and emergency departments.
The flow diagrams were constructed based upon the experience of the patient, chart review,
discussion with the involved physicians as well as several physician colleagues, comparison of our
diagrams with those developed by the hospital of interest for internal planning purposes, and an
iterative process with one of the co-authors who is a system dynamics expert. A dynamic
hypothesis was developed using insights gained by building the flow diagrams.
Results: The incidents originated in design flaws and many small innocuous system changes that
have occurred incrementally over time, which by themselves may have no consequence but in
conjunction with some system randomness can have serious consequences. In the patient's case,
the incidents that occurred in preoperative assessment and surgery originated in communication
and procedural failures. System delays, communication failures, and capacity issues contributed
largely to the subsequent incidents. Some of these issues were controllable by the physicians and
staff of the institution, whereas others were less controllable. To the system's credit, some of the
more controllable issues were addressed, but systemic problems like overcrowding are unlikely to
be addressed in the near future.
Conclusion: This is first instance that we are aware of in the literature where a system dynamics
approach has been used to analyze a patient safety experience. The qualitative system dynamics
analysis was useful in understanding the system, and contributed to learning on the part of some
components of the system. We suggest that further data collection and quantitative analysis would
be highly informative for identification of system changes to improve quality and safety.
Background
Patient safety and quality of care are crucial issues in
health systems worldwide. Despite frequent calls for a sys-
tems approach to patient safety [1-3], systems analyses of
incidents that occur in the process of health care delivery
are rare. The retrospective nature of typical assessments of
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incidents necessitates use of simple methods such as root
cause analysis [4], which, although informative, does not
model system interactions and how a system changes over
time. In contrast, system dynamics modeling [5] is a pow-
erful and flexible means to represent complex systems and
interactions. System dynamics has been applied to a lim-
ited degree in health care in general [6-11], and to a very
limited degree in patient safety [12], but a search of the
PubMed online database did not result in any published
explorations of actual patient safety events.
The unfortunate experience of one of the authors pro-
vided a case study for which a qualitative system dynamics
model could be built. This patient/author is a patient
safety researcher who works within an academic hospital
system, and thus was able to observe events with perhaps
more fidelity than a typical patient; plus he had the addi-
tional observational advantage of a spouse who is also a
researcher and who accompanied him throughout the
process of care. We interpret the sequence of events as an
illustrative case of cascading incidents that resulted in out-
comes that were less than optimal, although fortunately
not fatal. Incidents, in this paper, are defined as deviations
from an optimal pathway of care. In this sense, incidents
not only include errors or mistakes, but missed diagnoses
or conditions, delays in treatment, etc. [13]. Such inci-
dents can inform how systems perform in a suboptimal
fashion.
The patient was subject to a routine outpatient procedure:
removal of an epididymis due to the existence of large
cysts (i.e. spermatoceles). The procedure was performed
under general anesthesia by a senior urology resident,
under observation by an attending urologist. No drains
were placed. The patient was sent home with pain medi-
cation, antibiotics and a scrotal support packed with
gauze. Table 1 is a sample of incidents that resulted in
pain and discomfort, worry, and additional encounters
with the health care system.
Table 1: Incidents that occurred during the process of care
Step in process Department Incident Outcome
Preoperative assessment Surgery/Urology Failure to warn or notify patient to stop 
gabapentin*
Hemorrhage, purpura (after surgery)
Surgery Surgery/Urology Failure to stop bleeding Hemorrhage, swelling, pain, worry
Failure to install drains Swelling, pain
Post-operative process Emergency Failure to be seen by physician Delay, swelling, pain, worry
Failure to call urology resident Delay in being seen
Failure to triage and to recognize ongoing 
bleeding
Near syncope
Surgery/Urology Lack of beds Waiting without supervision 
(risky for many reasons)
Emergency, Surgery/Urology Inexperienced residents recommending 
overly conservative "watch and wait"
Continued swelling, purpura, pain, 
worry
Attending not seeing patient Expert assessment not provided
Second preoperative assessment Surgery/Urology Released without being seen Expert assessment not provided
Second surgery Anesthesia Failure to warn or notify patient to stop 
gabapentin
Longer recovery
Surgery/Urology Inexpert IV insertion Hemorrhage, purpura (in arm)
Long wait for surgery Swelling, pain, worry
*Note that gabapentin can increase vasodilation and purpura in 1% of patients. The health system of interest appropriately asks patients at multiple 
points in the process of care as to what medications they take; however, there was never a suggestion that the patient should stop taking this drug.Patient Safety in Surgery 2009, 3:1 http://www.pssjournal.com/content/3/1/1
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The patient experienced a large degree of scrotal swelling
(eventually up to approximately 15 cm), and subcutane-
ous spread of blood down both legs to the knees and up
to the mid-waist. As instructed and as typical in the health
system of interest, the patient went to the emergency
department (ED) and asked that the urology resident on
call be summoned. The emergency department was
crowded, and the hospital had no beds available at the
time. The patient called the resident himself as the pain
and swelling persisted, his heart rate increased, and he
became faint. He was never seen by an emergency physi-
cian. The urology resident arrived later, then called a more
senior resident; they took the conservative "watch and
wait" approach. After an extremely uncomfortable night
at home, the patient called the urology department the
next morning and was seen by senior residents and an
attending physician. He was re-admitted to surgery (after
many hours of delay due to scheduling issues), where-
upon a large clot was removed, a leaking artery tied off,
general bleeding cauterized, and drains installed. Ultra-
sound indicated that blood flow to the testicle had not
been compromised. Other than a large degree of internal
scarring, the eventual outcome was acceptable.
An important point is to not view the incidents in Table 1
as a "laundry list" of complaints, but rather as symptoms
of system problems. We can use the patient's experience
along with some simple models to gain insights into the
behaviour of the system. These insights suggest system
improvements.
Methods
In the field of system dynamics, a process of qualitative
and quantitative modeling has been developed to inform
difficult issues to the degree possible [5]. The system
dynamics method is a good way to approach the dynamic
complexity of health systems [14]. "Problem articulation"
is the first step. In this case, a system exists in which it is
possible to have a series of events that result in subopti-
mal care. It could be argued that the entire health system
of the US can be characterized in this way, but our intent
is not to model this entire system; rather, we will focus on
a subsystem that led to the incidents of interest. Likewise,
our focus is not on a cohort of patients or the entire med-
ical history of the patient of interest; rather we will focus
on a time block of several days over which the events of
interest for the patient of interest took place. By focusing
the problem thusly, we can explore it to a greater level of
detail.
A "dynamic hypothesis" is "a working theory of how the
problem arose" [5]. In this paper, we develop a dynamic
hypothesis using patient flow diagrams. The flow dia-
grams were constructed based upon the experience of the
patient (as recorded during and after the events), medical
chart review, discussion with the physicians involved with
his care as well as several physician colleagues, compari-
son of our flow diagrams with those developed by the
hospital of interest for internal planning purposes, and an
iterative process with one of the co-authors who is a sys-
tem dynamics expert. Note that our intent is not to
develop a fully functional quantitative simulation model,
as this is not possible given current availability of data,
but rather to structure the problem to clarify some issues
that may have intuitive meaning for administrators and
policy makers, and which may suggest some "fixes".
The patient flow diagrams are made up of three basic
types of variables, using standard nomenclature as
applied in the system dynamics field:
1. A "stock" of patients, shown by a variable in a rectangu-
lar box. Typically a stock variable describes the state of the
patient at that point in the process.
2. A "flow" of patients from one stock to another, shown
by a variable above a "flow valve" symbol. Flows across
system boundaries are denoted by "cloud" symbols.
3. Auxiliary variables that influence the flows – typically
these are capacities, resources, delay times, etc.
Arrows are used to denote a causal relationship between
variables.
Results
The outpatient surgery system
The urology surgical system that the patient encountered
is likely to be similar to many outpatient surgery systems
for medical specialties. Ideally, everything goes well and
the patient flow through the outpatient surgery system is
as shown in Figure 1.
The flow of People Developing Conditions Requiring
Outpatient Surgery is continually maintained by disease
progression and events occurring randomly in the general
population. People become "patients" when their condi-
tion reaches the point of requiring medical attention.
When a family physician determines that the condition
requires surgery, a referral is made and the patient goes
onto a waiting list for outpatient surgery, here called
Patients Waiting for Consult with Specialist. This stock is
depleted by an Outpatient Surgery Decision, controlled by
the access to consultant resources, here called Outpatient
Access to Experienced Consultants. Non-surgical treat-
ment decisions, not shown in the diagram, would also
deplete this stock and move such patients outside of the
system boundary. The flow of Outpatient Surgery Admit-
ting is controlled primarily by Outpatient Surgery Capac-
ity. Note that surgeries are routinely cancelled and thusPatient Safety in Surgery 2009, 3:1 http://www.pssjournal.com/content/3/1/1
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delayed, largely due to scheduling/capacity issues. After
successful operations, patients leave the stock of Patients
Undergoing Outpatient Surgery, which frees up space for
more patients to be admitted. Ideally, Patients Recovering
from Outpatient Surgery are monitored by the surgeon or
staff to ensure a successful recovery, but the natural heal-
ing process (denoted by the variable Outpatient Surgery
Recovery Time) determines the rate of Outpatient Surgery
Patients Becoming Healthy People. If the surgery is not
successful or untoward outcomes result, the patient may
be admitted to a hospital.
If the patient of interest had experienced the Outpatient
Surgery System as described above, all would have been
well and this paper would not have been written. How-
ever, the patient did not have an ideal experience, and as
a result also experienced the ED system, which will be
described next.
The ED system
The patient flow paths in the ED system are shown in Fig-
ure 2. Briefly, "urgent patients" are defined here as both
those at immediate risk of serious morbidity or death (i.e.,
emergent patients), as well as those with medical condi-
tions that have the potential to escalate to emergencies.
These patients in the health system of interest present to a
paramedic, who registers the patient, and takes vital signs
and chief complaint(s). If the patient requires resuscita-
tion, they are "fast-tracked" to the resuscitation room.
Remaining patients (after waiting) are triaged, and the
subsequent process depends upon the triage score and
their particular condition.
In a typical system, patients are admitted when a treat-
ment space becomes available and the triage nurse deter-
mines that the patient is the next highest priority to be
seen. The ED of interest is also used essentially as a referral
center for consults with specialists (as in the case here),
and is also a source of primary care for a large urban unin-
sured population, thus it is subject to capacity and flow
issues.
Interaction between the two systems
Some of the problems that the patient encountered arose
because of the nature of the interaction, or in some cases,
lack of interaction between the two systems. Figure 3
shows the system interactions, with the ED system shown
only up to ED Assess, Treat and Consult.
The outpatient surgery system becomes "connected" to
the ED system when there are post-surgery complications.
In the case of post-surgical complications, the patient
actually leaves the normal outpatient surgery system and
does not enter a state of normal recovery. The Patients
with Post Surgical Complications are in limbo between
the two systems. The route of Patients with Complications
Going to ED is dictated by the patient's or advocate's sense
of urgency and the availability/capacity of the health sys-
tem of interest. If the patient feels the complication does
not require immediate attention, the route may be
Patients with Complications Seeking Outpatient Care. In
the present case, the patient had a sense of urgency and
the ED system was the only option available. For Patients
in ED Waiting for Assessment, control of the decision for
ED Admitting versus ED Referral to Outpatient Care falls
under the ED system. In this case, there was no other
choice given to the patient (although in retrospect the
patient could have perhaps worked around this by aggres-
sive personal interaction with the urology resident on-
call). The system in Figure 3 is somewhat idealized
because it assumes a simple emergency/non-emergency
decision controls the choice of flow path out of Triage. In
reality, there are system constraints and system push-back
that often prevent patients from accessing the ED system
in an effective and timely fashion.
In Figure 4, we add another recycle loop called Watch and
Wait and add several of the important factors that were
influencing system flows in this patient's case. We also
add the important outflow called Severe Morbidity or
Death from Complications. In this case, the most likely
severe consequence would have been testicular necrosis,
but it would have been possible for other severe outcomes
The Outpatient Surgery System Figure 1
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or death to have occurred. For example, if the patient exac-
erbated the condition by taking aspirin or non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs for pain, was mentally or socially
compromised, and became frustrated so that he left with-
out being seen and did not follow up; the bleeding could
have progressed to a point where the stitches burst and the
patient bled to death.
Figure 4 also shows that patients in this system who are
suffering from post-surgery complications are competing
for ED resources with other Patients Requiring Urgent
Care. Some (or many) of these patients may have more
urgent conditions than the patient of interest, and, given
the evidence that there was waiting room overcrowding
when the patient arrived, there is pressure to delay admit-
ting and adopt a "watch and wait" approach. This is cap-
tured in the system diagram (Figure 4) by the Pressure to
Delay ED Admitting variable. The ED Admitting flow is
zero unless Patients in ED Treatment Spaces are less than
ED Patient Capacity. In other words, an existing patient
has to leave before a new patient can be admitted. It is
well known [6,7] that ED beds can be blocked by down-
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stream bottlenecks. For example, Patients in ED Waiting
for Inpatient Admission (Figure 3) can block ED beds
until inpatient space becomes available. Inpatient beds
can also be blocked by other means, such as sick elderly
patients who cannot leave the hospital because there are
no long term care spaces available.
Another factor influencing the likelihood of a "watch and
wait" approach is the ED Access to Experienced Consult-
Simplified View of ED System/Outpatient Surgery System Interactions Figure 3


















































A More Realistic View of System Interactions Figure 4
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ants. It is unreasonable to expect that an ED can provide
immediate access to attending consultants of every kind.
In a typical US teaching hospital, resident consultants are
on-call and an attending physician consultant would only
be called in to accept the case if the attending ED physi-
cian convinced the attending consultant that the patient
required immediate specialized medical attention. In this
patient's case, 1) the ED failed to call the resident, and
thus the patient did so after a period of frustration, and 2)
when he arrived, the on-call resident had no experience
with the sort of morbidity that was exhibited, thus he
called a more senior resident. This resident again was
unsure as to appropriate action, and called an attending
urologist. This urologist made the decision to "watch and
wait" until the next day. There were no ED beds available,
so rather than spend the night sitting in an uncomfortable
chair the patient elected to go home at this point. In the
diagram, the residents/attending thus made a Non-Emer-
gency Referral Decision and the patient was routed back to
the Outpatient Surgery System.
The bleeding was addressed by the second surgery, and
drains were placed in the scrotum. Subsequent to the sur-
gery, the patient had a large amount of bruising at the site
of the intravenous drip that was placed (a result of inex-
pert placement), and a painful throat due to inexpert intu-
bation. As a result of the large amount of swelling and
fluid accumulation, the patient had to manage the drains
for more than 2 weeks. Health economists use a measure
called health-related quality of life (HRQOL) [15] to
quantify not only benefits of treatment, but discomfort,
pain, suffering, and other undesirable outcomes of medi-
cal care. The patient, if given one of these questionnaires
at the time, would have rated his HRQOL as very low for
approximately two months during and after the surgery.
Fortunately, the only permanent negative outcome was
internal scarring. If the patient had lost a testicle, devel-
oped infections, etc. post surgery; it could have been
much worse.
Dynamic hypothesis
Like many adverse events in complex systems, this one has
no single root cause but rather arose from a multi-layered,
time-related combination of system failures. Our hypoth-
esis is that these failures originated in the design of the
system, and in the many small innocuous system changes
that have occurred incrementally over time, which by
themselves may have no consequence but in conjunction
with some system randomness (e.g., "bad luck") can have
serious consequences. For example, the past decision to
use the ED as a referral center for consultants outside of
normal business hours, which may be efficient in some
instances or may have been at one time, was a major
source of delay in this case due to the patient "falling
between the cracks" on a busy night. The numerous other
changes that have likely occurred over time are beyond the
scope of this paper, but would constitute an interesting
study.
In the patient's case, the incidents that occurred in preop-
erative assessment and surgery (see Table 1) originated in
communication and procedural failures. System delays,
communication failures, and capacity issues contributed
largely to the subsequent incidents. Some of these issues
were controllable by the physicians and staff of the insti-
tution (e.g. "failure to stop bleeding", "failure to call urol-
ogy resident"), whereas others were less controllable (e.g.
"lack of beds", "long wait for surgery"). To the system's
credit, some of the more controllable issues were
addressed (see below), but systemic problems like over-
crowding are unlikely to be addressed in the near future.
Discussion
We have presented a qualitative system model of a series
of incidents that were tracked by the patient of interest
and his advocate, confirmed via chart review, and ana-
lyzed by the patient and colleagues. These incidents
occurred despite the fact that the patient was familiar with
the system and many of the staff; plus he had an informed
and aggressive advocate in the form of his spouse who
accompanied him throughout the process of care (the
patient himself had difficulty thinking at times due to dis-
comfort and the large amount of pain medication he was
taking); i.e., "it can happen to anyone". The consequences
for a less informed or capable patient (e.g., a non-English
speaker, an alcoholic, etc.) may have been much more
severe.
This experience provides an excellent case example of sys-
tem failures and inefficiencies that fortunately resulted in
transient negative outcomes (as opposed to serious per-
manent injury or death), and allowed the patient and his
colleagues to document and analyze the case. Please note
that this case is by no means unique or limited to the
health system of interest; every patient population and
hospital system in the US, and indeed worldwide, is sub-
ject to such system failures.
After recovery and return to work, the patient wrote a brief
note to the Chairs of the Departments involved, describ-
ing the events (similar to Table 1) and suggesting how the
state of the system, including communication between
Departments, might be improved. The Chairs were appre-
ciative of the note, and noted that they were taking the
case seriously.
In general, hospital systems have not been designed using
operations management and industrial engineering meth-
ods that have been applied in many other industries, with
the primary goals of efficient production, quality andPatient Safety in Surgery 2009, 3:1 http://www.pssjournal.com/content/3/1/1
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safety. Although many hospital systems recognize that
these methods should be applied (as evidenced by numer-
ous patient safety papers and reports in the literature (e.g.,
[2,6,8,10,11,14,16,17] and available courses and lectures
on the subject; e.g. [18]), there are many barriers to imple-
mentation [19]. In many cases, recognition that hospitals
are institutions that should have quality and safety as pri-
mary goals is sadly lacking.
In the system of interest here, three factors will likely
impede major organizational changes in the near future.
The first is the fact that, on a typical day, dozens of similar
failures of the system likely occur; some less, and some
much more serious. Some result in no action on the part
of the patients, as they may be unaware that the negative
consequences of their care were outside of the norm, or
they may have come to expect that their encounters with
a health system will be suboptimal. At the other extreme,
some result in major lawsuits and/or large settlements.
However, it is unlikely that many components of the
health system will ever reach the state of "ultrasafety" that
other industries have achieved [19], especially in a case
such as this where multiple departments are involved and
interact. The key is to learn from incidents and to improve
the system to the degree possible [20,21]. Although there
was limited learning as a result of this incident, at present
the health system of interest does not have a formal inci-
dent learning (as opposed to simple reporting) system in
place; this will be required for substantial improvement.
The second factor that will impede change is that the
health system of interest, as related to the incidents
described, has an entrenched policy in which the ED is
used as a primary care center and a referral center in addi-
tion to its intended use for urgent and emergent care. This
again is a difficult issue. Simply providing, for example,
urgent care centers as clearinghouses would not solve the
problem, as staffing these centers would be problematic
given current chronic staff shortages nationwide.
Although there was some risk in the clinical decision that
the patient's condition was not an emergency (e.g., he
could have gone the Severe Morbidity or Death from
Complications route), the overall system requires checks
and balances to prevent abuse. In this case, the ED was the
only referral system that the patient could access outside
of normal working day hours. However, if people per-
ceived that ED Access to Experienced Consultants during
normal working hours was greater than Outpatient Access
to Experienced Consultants, then more people would go
to ED to seek medical attention for non-urgent condi-
tions. System designers should take considerations such
as this into account. The patient could have, in retrospect,
perhaps used personal contacts and workarounds to
improve his personal care, but that would do nothing to
improve the system.
The third factor is the patient went to a teaching hospital
for his surgery. Teaching hospitals provide a valuable serv-
ice; i.e., training of students and residents, but in this case
the hierarchical system of assessment and treatment by
junior and senior residents introduced delays and failures
in the system that contributed to the problem. Again, the
patient could have perhaps insisted upon seeing an
attending physician at all times, but this would likely have
been infeasible in terms of availability of those physi-
cians. He could have gone to a private hospital, but in the
city of interest the private hospitals seem to have similar
wait time, delay, and quality issues as the teaching hospi-
tal. These issues would best be informed by careful opera-
tional assessment of the system, using tools such as
quantitative system dynamics, but also discrete event sim-
ulation and optimization [7,22,23]. These sorts of models
require data and/or expert opinion on a large number of
variables, and it would often be necessary to supplement
existing information collection systems in order to build
meaningful models. Success is dependent upon availabil-
ity of resources in a financially constrained system.
Regardless, data collection and modeling are likely to be
highly cost-effective both in terms of increases in effi-
ciency and perhaps avoidance of lawsuits.
Some changes in the system were prompted by this
patient's experience, due to both the willingness of the
system to accept change as well as the initiative of the
patient in bringing system deficiencies to the light of day.
The ED has instituted a "patient arrival form", which
includes documentation of any referrals that are neces-
sary. This form is provided to both the charge nurse and
to triage. The urology division presented the patient's case
at its morbidity rounds, and the senior residents informed
the patient that after this experience that they would
always place drains after similar surgery. Provision of
information similar to Table 1 to both departments
helped clarify some of the system problems; this paper
should bring further clarification to a wider audience.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented a qualitative system
dynamics analysis of a series of incidents that affected one
of the authors, and which involved interactions across
departments. The system dynamics approach applied
here, although qualitative, allows more extensive analysis
of a complex system than many other methods currently
applied in health care. Ideally, given further data collec-
tion and more cases to evaluate, a quantitative computa-
tional model could be built and employed to model the
system in more detail and with greater generalisability.
Computational system dynamics methods are able to
evaluate policy changes and 'what-if' scenarios that can be
highly informative for decision-makers. As application of
system dynamics in patient safety is in its infancy, we arePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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currently exploring development of a computational
model and application to a wide variety of safety issues in
a research setting. Once the methods have been 'tested' on
a variety of scenarios, and the reliability of the model eval-
uated, we could then explore more routine use of the
model in informing safety programs as well as more gen-
eral operational aspects of the system.
We suggest that both qualitative and quantitative system
dynamics approaches can and should be added to the
'toolbox' of methods that are being applied to patient
safety problems in health systems worldwide. System
dynamics provides a means to engage clinical staff and
administrators in assessing and understanding complex
safety issues and possible solutions, and thus potentially
facilitates buy-in and action.
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